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ANNEX "A"

NAVAL AIR RESOURCES IN WESTERN EUROPE USEFUL TO THE USSR UNDER
CONDITIONS OF NIE-40

I. SUMMARY OF RESOURCES

The current naval air resources in Western Europe, some of which presumably would be available to the USSR in event of Soviet occupation, consist of 21 naval air stations, 653 aircraft, and 13,800 trained personnel on active duty. These quantities would enlarge the present resources of the Soviet Air Forces by only a very small fraction, but the positional advantages of the new bases would be of very great strategic significance.

Of the 15 countries designated in NIE-40 as comprising Europe west of the Iron Curtain, only three have any naval air establishments—France, Portugal, and The Netherlands. In these countries are 21 naval air stations, of which 12 are landplane bases and nine are seaplane bases. Of the former, only five are of good quality, i.e. have sturdy runways of 4000 feet or longer; and of the latter, likewise, only five are of good quality, i.e. have complete seaplane-handling facilities. The quality of the stations is indicated in the following table:

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NAVAL AIR STATIONS

<u>Country</u>	<u>*Classification No.</u>							<u>Total</u>
	<u>Landplane</u>					<u>Seaplane</u>		
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	
France	-	1	1	1	6	3	2	14
Portugal	-	-	-	2	-	2	2	6
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
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TOTAL	-	1	1	3	7	5	4	21

*Definitions of the seven numbered classifications are given in Annex C, pages C-4 and C-5

A complete list of the 21 naval air facilities in these countries is given in Annex C, in which are included also four other airfields, used by naval forces of those countries in conjunction with other military or civil activities, and operated by the civil authorities.

The 653 naval aircraft in Western Europe include only 219 combat aircraft, none of which is a jet. The non-combat aircraft are mostly trainer, transport and small reconnaissance types. The distribution among the three naval air forces is summarized as follows:

NAVAL AIRCRAFT

<u>Country</u>	<u>Fighter</u>	<u>Bomber</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
France	41	85	335	461
Portugal	—	—	68	68
Netherlands	84	9	31	124
TOTAL	125	94	434	653

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A complete inventory of naval aircraft in Western Europe is given in Annex B.

The number of trained and active naval aviation personnel in Western Europe is summarized in the following table:

NAVAL AVIATION PERSONNEL

	<u>Pilots</u>	<u>Other Air Crew</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
France	738	1,130	8,468	10,386
Portugal	55	142	335	532
Netherlands	<u>296</u>	<u>164</u>	<u>2,425</u>	<u>2,885</u>
Total	1,089	1,486	11,228	13,803

There are no naval air reserve personnel in Western Europe organized into units and receiving regular training. The number of unorganized naval air reservists is not known. A breakdown of personnel strengths into officer and enlisted categories is given in Annex B, together with an analysis of the organization, training and combat capabilities of the three naval air arms.

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II. DEFENSIVE ADVANTAGES

The acquisition of the naval air resources of Western Europe by the USSR would result in the following advantages to the defensive capabilities of the Soviet forces:

a. The Western powers would be denied the use of naval air bases on the Continent of Europe for anti-submarine warfare, and for the strategic and tactical bombing of enemy targets.

b. The Western powers would be denied the services of most of the naval aircraft repair facilities and trained personnel of the continental countries, although a few of the personnel would certainly escape to the United Kingdom or to North Africa, in some cases bringing aircraft with them.

c. The Western powers would be denied the use of aviation gasoline, ordnance, and other stores located at the naval air stations.

d. Soviet acquisition of naval air bases in Western Europe would extend the defensive operations of the Soviet Air Forces westward and southward, increasing their capabilities for air defense against carrier-based attacks originating in the North Sea, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean as well as against shore-based attacks from the United Kingdom, North Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. The number of naval air bases is very small, however, and only five are suitable for jets.

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e. Soviet possession of Western European territory would create an additional buffer zone, giving them earlier warning of Allied air attacks aimed at Russian targets if these attacks originated from the Atlantic, the United Kingdom, North Africa, or the Mediterranean.

f. The Soviets would acquire many of the fighter and reconnaissance aircraft and such few radars and anti-aircraft artillery as existed at naval air stations, as well as the trained naval air personnel, and could adapt some of these to air defense uses. However, none of the fighters is of a type used in the SAF, hence the Soviets would have to either: (1) retrain their own pilots or (2) indoctrinate the European pilots, despite the attendant risk of political unreliability. Moreover, none of the aircraft are jets, and the maximum number seizable would be small compared to the existing numbers of aircraft in the SAF. Seized stocks of aviation gasoline could be used in Soviet aircraft on defensive missions, and native ground personnel could be retrained to work on Soviet fighter aircraft. However, the number of trained personnel, including pilots, is small compared to the present large numbers in the SAF; and the problem of assuring political reliability of the personnel would be at least as difficult as that in the present (Eastern) satellite air forces.

g. The Soviets would gain valuable intelligence on naval aviation equipment, training methods and tactics of Western nations and of SHAPE.

h. Soviet Air Forces disposed in West European naval air stations might enjoy greater security from atomic bombing attacks due to possible Western reluctance to employ atomic bombs against Western Europe.

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i. The Soviet Air Forces would have bases for air defense in great depth over the European land mass. The bases would be widely dispersed. Soviet aviators forced down in this area would be easily recovered.

III. OFFENSIVE ADVANTAGES

The acquisition of the naval air resources of Western Europe by the USSR would result in the following advantages to the offensive capabilities of the Soviet forces:

a. Soviet acquisition of naval air bases in Western Europe would extend the land platform of the Soviet Air Forces westward to the English Channel and to the Atlantic Ocean, and southward to the Mediterranean. The next several points summarize the positional advantages of acquisition of these bases, but it should be borne in mind that the number of naval air bases is small and that only a few of them are suitable for postwar-model aircraft.

b. Soviet acquisition of such bases would enlarge the area of the Atlantic coming within the combat radii of Soviet bombers, enabling the SAF to employ light bombers, including jet light bombers, against Allied merchant and naval vessels off the coasts of France and Spain and in the Mediterranean. Some of the naval air bases are suitable for medium bombers and would permit use of Tu-4's against shipping as far west as the Canadian termini of the Atlantic convoy routes. In this connection,

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attention is called to an article in the O.N.I. Review for June 1951, prepared by OP322V2D6, (AFOIN-E/AE) entitled, "Soviet Air Capabilities Against Allied Shipping in Northwest European Approaches". The two maps accompanying this article show the probable gain in the radius of operation of Soviet light bombers with respect to Allied shipping that would result from Soviet occupation of Western Europe.

c. Soviet acquisition of Western European naval air bases would give the Soviets the capability for staging transport aircraft for an effective airborne operation against air bases or other important installations in North Africa, Iceland or the Azores, and to increase vastly the scale of airborne operations against the United Kingdom.

d. One or two of the naval air bases would be closer for the staging of strategic air assaults against targets in Newfoundland, Labrador, and the eastern half of the United States.

e. It would give the SAF the capability for aerial mining of ports in North Africa and would increase their ability to mine the harbors and estuaries of the British Isles.

f. The shorter radii of action would permit a greater number of sorties by tactical aircraft against targets currently within the combat radii of the SAF, including shipping in the North Sea, the English Channel and adjacent rivers and harbors, and all targets in the United Kingdom. This would allow greater intensity of attack in these areas.

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g. The shorter radii of action also would allow greater payloads by strategic bombers (Tu-4's) in conventional or atomic attacks against targets in the United Kingdom, in the Azores, in Iceland, in North Africa and at sea.

h. The shorter radii of action would enable the Soviets to furnish jet-fighter escorts for offensive missions over England and Wales and parts of North Africa as well as in the North Sea, the English Channel and coastal areas of the Atlantic and Mediterranean. This would apply to airborne operations, anti-shipping attacks and aerial mining as well as to every sort of bombing mission over land.

i. Soviet possession and use of coastal air bases would deny to the Western powers the buffer zone of Western Europe, which otherwise would permit early warning of Soviet air attacks against any of the off-Continent targets named above. From coastal bases, Soviet aircraft would fly solely over water en route to such targets, and so would be less subject to visual observation.

j. Soviet possession of such bases would deny to the West the air-defense equipment, personnel, bases and organizations of the Western European nations and SHAPE.

k. It would deny to the Western powers the Western European air bases close to the frontiers of Soviet-controlled territories.

l. It would deny to the Western powers the opportunity to observe several Soviet air bases in Germany and Austria from air corridors currently allotted to the West by quadripartite agreement.

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m. The Western powers' air defense against attacks originating on the European Continent would lack depth over land, and its bases would be confined to: (1) the islands of the United Kingdom; (2) the coasts of North Africa; and (3) carrier task forces. Airfields would be concentrated instead of dispersed. Allied aviators forced down at sea would not be so easily recoverable as over land.

n. The Soviets would acquire most of the bomber aircraft, offensive ordnance, related parts and facilities, POL, and trained personnel of the naval air forces of Western Europe. Soviet aviators are familiar with most of the bomber types due to their lend-lease experience and could easily operate them. However, the number of these aircraft is very small (68), all are light bombers, and none is of a postwar model. The number of trained personnel also is small compared to the present large numbers in the SAF; and the problem of assuring political reliability of the personnel would be at least as difficult as that in the present (Eastern) satellite air forces.

o. Soviet acquisition of coastal air bases would give them the capability of supporting their submarine offensives against Allied shipping by aerial reconnaissance and/or combat air patrols.

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